破解地区间“内卷式”竞争:国地税合并与企业异地投资
作者简介:贺立龙,四川大学经济学院教授(四川成都 610065);王馨瑶,四川大学经济学院硕士研究生、四川大学企业研究中心助理研究员(四川成都 610065);林篧,四川大学经济学院助理研究员(四川成都 610065)。
基金项目:
本文为国家社会科学基金重大项目“构建有利于激发经济发展内生动力的体制机制研究”(25&ZD109)的阶段性成果。
摘要: 深化税收征管改革和破除“内卷式”竞争对促进资本有序流动和合理配置、推进统一大市场建设具有关键作用。本文利用2010—2023年上市企业数据,检验2018年国地税机构合并对企业异地投资的影响,探究税收征管“统一化”对破解地区间“内卷式”竞争的作用。研究发现,改革发挥了“量减质升”的结构性规范效应:在抑制异地投资总量的同时,挤出了“空壳式”或“短视型”投资,矫正了民企过度投资倾向,约束了低生产率企业扩张,推动资本空间配置从政策驱动向效率驱动转变。改革通过三重路径破解“内卷式”竞争:一是上收地方政府的税收征管裁量权,遏制逐底竞争;二是改善企业信息透明度,提升投资审慎性;三是降低制度性交易成本,减少政企合谋。改革效应在经济压力大、政府干预多、市场化水平低的地区更显著,且集中在民营企业、中小企业和非重点产业企业。研究结论为理解税收征管改革如何规范政企行为、破解地区间“内卷式”竞争提供了经验证据。
Breaking Inter-regional Involutionary Competition: The National-Local Tax Agencies Integration and Cross-regional Investment
Abstract: Based on the data of listed companies over 2010—2023,we examine the impact of the merger of State Tax Bureau and Local Tax Bureaus on cross-regional investment from a perspective that combines quantity and quality.We find that the reform produced a structural regulatory effect.While inhibiting total investment volume,the reform squeezed out shell-type and short-sighted investment,corrected private enterprises'tendency toward excessive investment,constrained the expansion of firms with low total factor productivity,and shifted the spatial allocation of capital from policy-driven to efficiency-driven.The reform breaks involution through three ways.(1) Centralize tax discretion to curb the “race to the bottom”.(2) Improve transparency to enhance investment prudence.(3) Lower institutional transaction costs to limit government-firm collusion.This regulatory effect is not only more pronounced in regions with high growth targets,significant fiscal pressures,extensive government intervention,but also in private enterprises,small and medium-sized enterprises,and non-key industry firms.This study provides empirical evidence for how tax reform regulates behavior and dismantles involution,offering insights for further fiscal reform and a unified capital market.