What Is Kant's “Problem of the Thing-in-Itself”——With a Concurrent Critique of Mou Zongsan's Assertion and Li Minghui's Defense

Abstract: According to the standard narrative of Kant's transcendental idealism,neither the metaphysical "two-world" interpretation nor the methodological/epistemological "dual-aspect" interpretation is sufficient to fully justify Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself.Within Kant's theoretical philosophy,the relationship between the negative thing in itself and the positive thing-in-itself constitutes exactly the "problem of the thing-in-itself" that the critical philosophy itself should address.The metaphor of "reading" in the Critique of Pure Reason illustrates both how the negative thing-in-itself serves as the unreadable ground of readable experience and how the problem of the thing-in-itself relates to a yet-to-bejustified second perspective:that which is already "read as" appearance within the theoretical and cognitive perspective ought to have its "meaning beyond the words" understood in a second perspective.Mou Zongsan's assertion that the thing-in-itself is a concept of value rather than a concept of fact correctly points out that the concept of the thing-initself must ultimately be connected to Kant's practical philosophy,yet fails to properly understand Kant's problem of the thing-in-itself.Li Minghui's defense of Mou Zongsan's position,due to its failure to thoroughly implement a perspectivist approach,also misses the accurate articulation of the problem of the thing-in-itself.