从“惯例”到“合作原则”——概述博弈论制度分析的理论建构、现实意义及其局限性

方钦

从“惯例”到“合作原则”——概述博弈论制度分析的理论建构、现实意义及其局限性

方钦

作者简介: 方钦，复旦大学经济学院讲师（上海200433）。;

中图分类号: F09

From “Convention” to “the Principle of Co-operation”—— the Theoretical Construction,Practical Significance and Limitations of Game-theoretic Approaches to Institutions

FANG Qin

CLC number: F09

摘要: 在当代经济学制度分析领域，除了美国制度学派（即“旧制度经济学”）和新制度经济学两大流派之外，其实存在第三种、同时也是极易和新制度经济学理论相混淆的理论流派，这就是博弈论制度分析。博弈论制度分析的理论核心，出现于20世纪60年代末期，以大卫·刘易斯的著作《惯例》为基础；而其完整的制度分析理论框架的提出，则是以罗伯特·萨格登的《权利、合作与福利的经济学》为代表。围绕着这两本著作中提出的主要观点、分析方法和论证逻辑，可以了解博弈论制度分析从诞生到成为当代经济学制度分析不可或缺的一股研究思潮的发展过程。结合目前学界讨论较多的一些制度问题，比如“内卷”现象、制度的无效率问题以及市场失灵问题等，可例证博弈论制度分析相较于其他制度分析流派特有的理论优势。但由于博弈论制度分析所应用的基本分析工具——博弈理论——的限制，致使在面对真实世界的制度分析时，必然存在一些局限性，比如如何解释“合作的难题”，“演化论”蜕变为“决定论”，以及缺少系统性的制度变迁理论。而这些又预示着博弈论制度分析未来的发展趋势。
- 制度｜博弈论制度分析｜无形之手｜惯例｜合作原则
Abstract: This article outlines the formation,development,and theoretical characteristics and limitations of game-theoretic approaches to institutions.In the field of contemporary institutional analysis in economics,besides the American Institutionalism (or “Old Institutional Economics”) and New Institutional Economics,there actually exists a third theoretical school,which is easily confused with new institutional economics.This is game-theoretic approaches to institutions.The theoretical core of game-theoretic approaches to institutions emerged in the late 1960s,based on David Lewis’s work Convention.The complete theoretical framework for institutional analysis was later proposed,represented by Robert Sugden’s The Economics of Rights,Co-operation,and Welfare.This article briefly describes the development of game-theoretic approaches to institutions from its inception to its establishment as an indispensable research trend in contemporary economic institutional analysis,focusing on the main ideas,analytical methods,and logical arguments presented in these two seminal works.It also uses currently widely discussed institutional issues,such as the phenomenon of “involution,” institutional inefficiency,and market failure,to illustrate the unique theoretical advantages of game theory institutional analysis compared to other institutional analysis schools.However,the author also points out that due to the limitations of the basic analytical tools—game theory—there are inevitably some limitations when analyzing real-world institutions.These include explaining the “the dilemma of cooperation”,the “evolutionary theory” devolving into “determinism,” and the lack of a systematic theory of institutional change.These limitations also indicate the future development trends of game theory institutional analysis.
- Institutions,Game-theoretic Approaches to Institutions,invisible hand,Convention,the Principle of Co-operation
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沈阳化工大学材料科学与工程学院沈阳 110142

从“惯例”到“合作原则”——概述博弈论制度分析的理论建构、现实意义及其局限性

作者简介:方钦，复旦大学经济学院讲师（上海200433）。

关键词:

制度｜博弈论制度分析｜无形之手｜惯例｜合作原则

摘要: 在当代经济学制度分析领域，除了美国制度学派（即“旧制度经济学”）和新制度经济学两大流派之外，其实存在第三种、同时也是极易和新制度经济学理论相混淆的理论流派，这就是博弈论制度分析。博弈论制度分析的理论核心，出现于20世纪60年代末期，以大卫·刘易斯的著作《惯例》为基础；而其完整的制度分析理论框架的提出，则是以罗伯特·萨格登的《权利、合作与福利的经济学》为代表。围绕着这两本著作中提出的主要观点、分析方法和论证逻辑，可以了解博弈论制度分析从诞生到成为当代经济学制度分析不可或缺的一股研究思潮的发展过程。结合目前学界讨论较多的一些制度问题，比如“内卷”现象、制度的无效率问题以及市场失灵问题等，可例证博弈论制度分析相较于其他制度分析流派特有的理论优势。但由于博弈论制度分析所应用的基本分析工具——博弈理论——的限制，致使在面对真实世界的制度分析时，必然存在一些局限性，比如如何解释“合作的难题”，“演化论”蜕变为“决定论”，以及缺少系统性的制度变迁理论。而这些又预示着博弈论制度分析未来的发展趋势。

From “Convention” to “the Principle of Co-operation”—— the Theoretical Construction,Practical Significance and Limitations of Game-theoretic Approaches to Institutions

Abstract: This article outlines the formation,development,and theoretical characteristics and limitations of game-theoretic approaches to institutions.In the field of contemporary institutional analysis in economics,besides the American Institutionalism (or “Old Institutional Economics”) and New Institutional Economics,there actually exists a third theoretical school,which is easily confused with new institutional economics.This is game-theoretic approaches to institutions.The theoretical core of game-theoretic approaches to institutions emerged in the late 1960s,based on David Lewis’s work Convention.The complete theoretical framework for institutional analysis was later proposed,represented by Robert Sugden’s The Economics of Rights,Co-operation,and Welfare.This article briefly describes the development of game-theoretic approaches to institutions from its inception to its establishment as an indispensable research trend in contemporary economic institutional analysis,focusing on the main ideas,analytical methods,and logical arguments presented in these two seminal works.It also uses currently widely discussed institutional issues,such as the phenomenon of “involution,” institutional inefficiency,and market failure,to illustrate the unique theoretical advantages of game theory institutional analysis compared to other institutional analysis schools.However,the author also points out that due to the limitations of the basic analytical tools—game theory—there are inevitably some limitations when analyzing real-world institutions.These include explaining the “the dilemma of cooperation”,the “evolutionary theory” devolving into “determinism,” and the lack of a systematic theory of institutional change.These limitations also indicate the future development trends of game theory institutional analysis.