Multi-party Game and Informal Governance in Central-Local Fiscal Relations——Focusing on the Yinhao Reform of Guangdong Salt Tax in the Early Republic of China

After the Xinhai Revolution,the friction and confrontation between Guangdong and the central government over fiscal relations persisted for a long time.From 1913 to 1914,under the pressure of securing the “Rehabilitation Loan,” the Beiyang Government ordered Guangdong to collect salt tax in Yinhao (small-denomination silver coins),aiming to strengthen fiscal centralization.This demand,however,triggered a banknote disturbance and encountered resistance from local governments,merchant groups,and other non-state forces.Due to the varying degrees of involvement from foreign banking consortia,local merchant groups,overseas Chinese merchants,and the press,the tangled central—local fiscal relations evolved into a multi-party game.During this incident,merchant groups resisted government decisions through public opinion mobilization,collective petitioning,and native-place networks,compelling both central and local governments to make compromises.Overseas Chinese merchants and press opinion also played crucial roles in resolving the incident.This case not only reveals the complex interactions between central and local authorities,between the state and chambers of commerce,and between local interests and external forces in the early Republic of China,but also reflects the distinctive role of informal forces in local governance.