央地财政关系的多方博弈与非正式治理——以民初广东盐税改征银毫为中心
作者简介:熊昌锟,中国社会科学院大学经济学院教授(北京 102488);张紫源,中国社会科学院大学经济学院硕士研究生(北京 102488)。
基金项目:
本文系国家社会科学基金一般项目“晚清至民国时期的货币发行与币制改革研究(1843—1933)”(22BZS087)的阶段性成果
摘要: 辛亥革命后,广东地方与中央政府在财政关系上的摩擦与对抗长期延续。1913—1914年间,面对“善后大借款”的担保压力,北洋政府要求广东盐税改征银毫,以此强化中央财政集权,却一度引发纸币风波,遭到地方政府以及商人群体等民间力量的抵制。由于外国银行团、地方商人群体、海外侨商、报界舆论的不同程度介入,错综复杂的央地财政关系遂演变为多方博弈。风波之中,商人群体通过舆论动员、集体请愿、乡谊联系等方式对抗政府决策,迫使中央与地方政府做出妥协。海外侨商与报界舆论也为事件的解决发挥重要作用。这一事件不仅集中展现了民初中央与地方、政府与商会、本土利益与外来力量之间的复杂互动,也折射出非正式力量在地方治理中的特殊作用。
Multi-party Game and Informal Governance in Central-Local Fiscal Relations——Focusing on the Yinhao Reform of Guangdong Salt Tax in the Early Republic of China
Abstract: After the Xinhai Revolution,the friction and confrontation between Guangdong and the central government over fiscal relations persisted for a long time.From 1913 to 1914,under the pressure of securing the “Rehabilitation Loan,” the Beiyang Government ordered Guangdong to collect salt tax in Yinhao (small-denomination silver coins),aiming to strengthen fiscal centralization.This demand,however,triggered a banknote disturbance and encountered resistance from local governments,merchant groups,and other non-state forces.Due to the varying degrees of involvement from foreign banking consortia,local merchant groups,overseas Chinese merchants,and the press,the tangled central—local fiscal relations evolved into a multi-party game.During this incident,merchant groups resisted government decisions through public opinion mobilization,collective petitioning,and native-place networks,compelling both central and local governments to make compromises.Overseas Chinese merchants and press opinion also played crucial roles in resolving the incident.This case not only reveals the complex interactions between central and local authorities,between the state and chambers of commerce,and between local interests and external forces in the early Republic of China,but also reflects the distinctive role of informal forces in local governance.