隐显之间:心学历程中的“自由意志”
作者简介:高瑞泉,华东师范大学哲学系暨中国现代思想文化研究所教授(上海 200241)
摘要: 发自先秦孔孟一系的观念前驱,“自由意志”在近代心学的演化中呈现其概念化的脉络。王国维的《原命》、梁漱溟的“意欲”(will)论文化哲学以及而后发生的“科玄论战”,使“自由意志”开始显题化。它有外在的触因,即与叔本华唯意志论的东传有关;又有本土的哲学根源,在心学观念史中有迹可循。往上追溯可至王门后学诸人。王艮的“造命”说在传统的“力命之争”中酝酿出对定命论的挑战,王栋、王塘南到刘宗周将“意”推演至本体的地位,以及将“意”与“志”相勾连的尝试,使“良知”论翻出了新面向。从词汇研究观念史来看,“意志”乃一个日语激活词,其在近代的诞生,应该获得超越语文学的部分解释。梁漱溟之后,熊十力提示以康德的“自由意志”绾合本体论与伦理学的哲学路径。熊氏传人牟宗三以“良知是呈现”为纲,将“自由意志”收纳为“良知”之一大属性,并将其转变为“智的直觉”课题,助成其建构“道德的形而上学”。“自由意志”的显题化和概念化,扩张了传统哲学的问题域,也深化了对于主体能动性的认识。
The Obscure and the Conspicuous: The Concept of Free Will in the Course of Development of Monism of Mind
- Available Online:
2022-11-20
Abstract: First coined by Confucius and Mencius in pre-Qin era, the concept of “free will” evolved alongside modern Monism of Mind and into several sub-concepts. With Wang Guowei’s article “Original Fate”, Liang Shuming’s discussion of “will” in the philosophy of culture and, later on, the emergence of Polemics of Science and Metaphysics, “free will” emerged as a topic of discourse. While there were external influences, namely, Schopenhauer’s Voluntarism as it spread to the East, “free will” has its roots in Chinese philosophy, as evident in the history of concept of Monism of Mind, stemming from the ideas of Wang Yangming’s disciples. In the traditional debate of Effort and Fate, Wang Gen’s “creation of fate” first challenged Fatalism. In Wang Dong, Wang Tangnan and Liu Zongzhou’s analysis, the idea of Yi (意, intention) took center stage, while the effort to connect Yi and Zhi (志, aspiration), further developed the concept of Liangzhi (良知, innate knowledge). “意志” as a word came from Japanese and involved blending of ancient Chinese words that subsequently became obsolete and Western vocabulary. Therefore, the creation of the term “意志” in modern history deserve explanations beyond a linguistic perspective. After Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili proposed Kantian “free will” in the philosophical discussions in consolidated Ontology and Ethics. Xiong’s disciple Mou Zongsan based his analysis on the guiding principle of “innate knowledge is presentation”, categorizing ‘free will’ as a main characteristic of Liangzhi and turning it into a discourse of “intellectual intuition” which became part of “the metaphysics of morals”. The process of turning “free will” into topics of discourse and the conceptualization of it not only expanded the problem set of traditional Chinese philosophy, but also deepened the understanding of subjectivity.