Abstract: Current development and practical application of artificial intelligence have given rise to a growing concern:whether AI agents possess or can possess moral status. According to the standard approach to moral status,the moral status of an entity depends on certain intrinsic attributes that it actually or potentially possesses. When this viewpoint is applied to AI agents,whether they possess moral status depends on whether they possess or can possess the intrinsic attributes required for moral status,especially certain mental capabilities. At present,inquiry into this issue is normally hypothetical,attempting to show that if AI agents have these intrinsic attributes or mental capabilities,they can or should be attributed moral status. However,this kind of approach is difficult to provide practical guidelines for properly understanding the nature of AI agents and handling human-machine relationships. This article aims to show that if phenomenal consciousness can be regarded as the minimum condition for possessing moral status,then from the current development of artificial consciousness,AI agents at present and in the near future are likely to have no moral status.