Abstract: The topic on the relation of Wittgenstein and pragmatism has been controversial among Wittgenstein scholars since Wittgenstein’s death in the international philosophical circle. Most insisted on the similarities and affinities between the two. However, I argue in the essay that Wittgenstein’s understanding of pragmatism is far away from our understanding as scholars supposed. By analyzing the texts in which Wittgenstein mentioned pragmatism, I propose that Wittgenstein could not be viewed as a pragmatist in any sense. Some scholar assumed that there were some commitments common to both Wittgenstein and pragmatism. But I argue against the assume by analyzing the difference between them in their understanding of the commitments. Finally, I will argue that the discussion of the relation of Wittgenstein and pragmatism is kind of academic work in the history of influence of Wittgenstein on pragmatism rather than of pragmatism on Wittgenstein in turn.