面向实情本身—谢林的经验论与虚无主义问题
To the Things Themselves
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摘要: 从黑格尔哲学体系逐渐退潮的19世纪中叶开始,超感性的形而上学概念对现实的经验与实情逐步失去了支配能力,这正是尼采与海德格尔所揭示的现代虚无主义局面。这一新的哲学取向最早出现于谢林哲学之中。晚期谢林将本质(Was)与事物的实情(Dass)进行了区分,并在此前提下提出“哲学经验论”,将其在绝对唯心论中与唯理论进行更高维度的和解,由此挽救现代虚无主义所带来的分裂。谢林“拯救经验”的努力最终走向了超越经验和理性的超越性开端,这一开端来自神性的自由绽出和意志化的决断行动,并由此成为没有根据和不能再被奠基的深渊性开端,结果反而将现代虚无主义的根源暴露得更为彻底。Abstract: Since the mid-19th century, when Hegel’s philosophical system gradually declined, the metaphysical concept of supersensory world gradually lost its ability to control the real experience and reality, which is the modern nihilism situation revealed by Nietzsche and Heidegger. However, this new philosophical orientation first appeared in Schelling’s philosophy. In his later period, Schelling distinguished the essence (Was) from the existence and reality of things (Dass), and put forward “philosophical empiricism” based on this distinction, and reconciled it with rationalism in a higher dimension in absolute idealism, thus saving the division and collapse brought about by modern nihilism. Finally, Schelling’s efforts to “save experience” have gone beyond experience and rationality. This beginning comes from the free ekstasis of divinity and voluntarism resolution. It is an abyssal beginning that has no basis and cannot be founded any more. Consequently, it exposes the root of modern nihilism more thoroughly.
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Key words:
- Schelling /
- reason /
- reality /
- empiricism /
- nihilism
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