意识分析的两种基本形态—兼论通向超越论—发生现象学的莱布尼茨道路
The Two Fundamental Forms of Consciousness Analysis
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摘要: 通常意义上的意识现象学是指意识体验或意识行为的现象学。胡塞尔一生在公开发表著作中所做的意识分析,绝大多数都是对意识体验的静态结构的现象学分析。但在胡塞尔一生的讲座稿和研究手稿中,他自1905年开始就已经进行意识发生结构的分析。这一意识分析已经不再局限于意识体验分析,而是自1916年起就明确地指向意识能力或意识权能的分析。在这个方向上,意识权能现象学与功能心理学和无意识理论的研究并行不悖,但具备自己在方法和内容方面的鲜明特色和显著成果。Abstract: The phenomenology of consciousness in the common sense refers to the phenomenology of consciousness experience or act. All through Husserl’s life, most of his analyses of consciousness in his published works are the phenomenological analyses of the static structure of consciousness experience; in his lectures and manuscripts, whereas, the analyses of the genetic structure of consciousness already began early from 1905. The analyses of consciousness at that time were no longer limited to those of consciousness experience but had, since 1916, been definitely directed upon those of consciousness capacity or capability (Bewußtseinsvermögen). In this direction, the phenomenology of consciousness capability was on a par with the studies of functional psychology and the theories of unconsciousness, but had its distinctive characteristics and prominent fruits in terms of method and content.
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Key words:
- Leibnitzian /
- Husserl’s phenomenology /
- consciousness act /
- consciousness capability
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