基层政府灵活性的生产与预算约束软化——基于西乡乡属国有企业的分析
The Production of Flexibility in Local Governments and the Softening of Budgetary Constraints——An Analysis Based on Township-Owned Enterprises in Xixiang
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摘要: 乡镇一级政府作为国家行政体系的末梢,其财政基础自创设之初就具有明显的“不完全财政”特征。财政收入能力与支出责任之间持续性、制度性的失衡导致基层政府不断寻求突破预算约束、进行制度创新。在项目制与专项债制度的背景下,基层政府通过创设乡属国有企业实现了预算约束软化。乡镇政府将乡属国有企业塑造为承接专项债资金与项目的法定主体,利用乡属国企的双重属性延续行政主导的资源分配逻辑,通过项目包装、资源转换、政策负担承接方式实现自身财政资源配置灵活性的生产。这种“行政借道企业”的机制是基层政府在新的约束条件下对“不完全财政”的回应,呈现了预算约束软化的一种新形态,但是这也导致了地方债增长及债务风险积累等隐性后果。Abstract: As the terminal point of the national administrative system, township-level governments have exhibited pronounced characteristics of "incomplete finances" since their inception. The persistent, systemic imbalance between fiscal revenue capacity and expenditure responsibilities has driven these governments to continually seek ways to circumvent budgetary constraints and pursue institutional innovation. Against the backdrop of project-based funding and special bond systems, grassroots governments have achieved a softening of budgetary constraints by establishing township-affiliated state-owned enterprises. Township governments have fashioned these enterprises as the statutory entities to receive special bond funds and projects. By leveraging the dual nature of these enterprises, they perpetuate the administrative logic of resource allocation. Through project packaging, resource conversion, policy burden-sharing, and fund borrowing, they generate flexibility in their own fiscal resource allocation. This mechanism of "administrative borrowing through enterprises " represents grassroots governments' response to "incomplete finance " under new constraints, presenting a new form of budgetary constraint softening. However, it has also led to implicit consequences such as increased local debt and accumulated debt risks.
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