行政激励与乡村治理的逻辑
Administrative Incentives and the Logic of Rural Governance
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摘要: 在资源下乡的背景之下，如何做到基层治理有效，如何理解当前基层治理中普遍存在的形式主义，是一个复杂的理论问题。行政激励强弱与基层治理事务可考核性之间可以形成多种组合，强激励与弱可考核性的组合是造成基层治理有效性不足的一个重要原因。国家权力周期对于理解基层治理有效也是其中的关键。当前阶段，农民正在史无前例地进城，农村社会结构正在史无前例地重组，基层治理体系保持灵活性有助于适应中国农村正在发生的快速变迁。从基层治理有效角度来看，不存在绝对的适应任何条件的激励制度，而总是在基层治理中出现熵增时，国家及时调整制度，掌握国家权力收放的尺度。国家通过激励制度的调整，收放权力，以保持基层治理有效，从而适应中国农村正在发生的巨变。Abstract: In the context of resources going to the countryside, how to achieve effective grassroots governance and how to understand the prevailing formalism in current grassroots governance is a complex theoretical issue. Various combinations can be formed between the strength of administrative incentives and the assessability of grassroots governance affairs. The combination of strong incentives and weak assessability is an important reason for the lack of effectiveness of grassroots governance. The cycle of state power is also key to understanding the effectiveness of grassroots governance. At the current stage, farmers are moving to cities as never before, the social structure in rural areas is being restructured as never before, and the grass-roots governance system remains flexible, which helps to adapt to the rapid changes that are taking place in rural China. From the perspective of effective grassroots governance, there is no absolute incentive system that adapts to any conditions, but when there is always an increase in entropy in grassroots governance, the state adjusts the system in a timely manner to grasp the scale of state power. The state adjusts the incentive system and decentralizes power to maintain effective grassroots governance, thereby adapting to the great changes taking place in rural China.
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表 1 激励强弱与治理关联表
激励性强、硬考核 激励性弱、软考核 可考核性强 I 减熵（通过有效管理促进治理目标实现） II 增熵（因管理无效而造成具体目标无法实现） 可考核性弱 III 增熵（引发基层应付行为） IV 减熵（减少应付行为） 
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表 2 基层治理与时间序列表
分田到户初期 农业税费时期 税费改革后 以工哺农阶段 行政激励强弱 弱激励 负向强激励 弱激励 强激励 典型特征 无为而治 要钱要命 多予少取放活 监督下乡 权力收放 放权 收权 放权 收权 基层治理自主性 高 低 高 低 熵的变化 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 主要减熵措施 分田释放生产力 负向强激励 取消农业税 国家资源下乡 增熵主要原因 组织性持续降低 干群关系紧张 公共品供给不足 基层自主性降低
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